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The Church understands itself as an agent in complete human liberation, but regrettably it is 
often seen as belonging among those influences from which people need to be liberated. In 
continuing the dialogue with humanity outlined in Gaudium et spes the Church must pay 
attention to how she is regarded by dialogue partners. From the perspective of politics and 
public life, one influential and flattering account sees the Church as part of civil society. 
There is a danger in accepting this allocated public role if civil society is understood as 
distinguished from the political and the economic. The danger is of a restriction to particular 
rather than universal concerns, to advocacy rather than analysis, which would prevent the 
Church from exercising its appropriate mission. That mission requires it to address the 
political and socio-economic system as a whole. Granted the need to abide by a principle of 
restraint whenever engaging in public debate concerned with constraining the liberties of 
citizens, the Catholic Church would wish to have the kind of liberty as corporate citizen 
which would allow it address relevant issues without restriction. Rawls’s later model of 
public reason, within broad political culture (public reason in the broad sense) against the 
background of the culture of civil society, is perhaps a better tool to allow for the Church’s 






‘The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men (and women) of this age, 
especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these too are the joys and hopes, the 
griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed, nothing genuinely human fails to raise 
an echo in their hearts.’1 The bold opening sentences of the document announce a challenging 
programme. They also reflect the mindset of the 1960s, at least in the western world, when 
there was a genuine confidence that the initiatives undertaken following the Second World 
War in setting up the United Nations and in adopting a Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights would be fruitful. Also the economic recovery following the devastation of the war 
was strengthening awareness of the resources that could be made available so as to realise 
those hopes. The creation of the Bretton Woods institutions of the International Monetary 
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) in 
1944 were part of that movement of creativity and hope. The griefs and anxieties of the text 
echo the influential 1941 speech by Franklin D. Roosevelt in which he had set the agenda for 
America’s participation in the war and in the construction of a better world subsequently. He 
had announced the project of delivering people from what oppresses them by ensuring their 
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freedom. The ‘four freedoms’ as they came to be called, namely, the ‘freedom of speech and 
expression, freedom to worship God in one’s own way, freedom from want, and freedom 
from fear’ expressed a widely shared hope which had its shadow side in the prevalence of 
fear, poverty, and oppression.2
 
Almost twenty years since the end of the war, the Council could speak against the 
background of what had been achieved in that time. The achievements were considerable, 
and so the Council text can speak of progress without hesitation or embarrassment. In 
addressing the political community in chapter 4 of Gaudium et spes the Council could refer in 
passing to changes for the better resulting from ‘the cultural, economic and social evolution’ 
of peoples. It could refer to ‘cultural, economic and social progress’ (#73). Progress, 
evolution, had taken place, but there was no denying the continuing existence of tyranny and 
oppression, of poverty and injustice. So there is a great realism in what the Council 
proclaims. It relies on the language of human rights, echoing the achievement of the 
international community in expressing its post war aspirations in these terms, but underlining 
the reality that many of those proclaimed rights remained to be realised in fact. ‘Men (and 
women) are voicing disapproval of any kind of government which blocks civil or religious 
liberty, multiplies the victims of ambition and political crimes, and wrenches the exercise of 
authority from pursuing the common good to serving the advantage of a certain faction or of 
the rulers themselves. There are some such governments holding power in the world’ (#73). 
The Pastoral Constitution is a compendium of reflection on issues in which human hopes are 
still imperfectly realised. 
 
The bold proclamation of sharing hopes and fears was only moderately successful in finding 
partners in dialogue among the men and women of the age, who, although not believers 
themselves, could nonetheless recognise in the Church a partner in solidarity sharing the 
burden of delivering humanity from all that oppresses it.3 The impact of the Council’s 
Pastoral Constitution was mainly felt within the Church, and led to a revitalization of 
Christians’ own self-understanding of their role in public, economic and political life. 
Unfortunately, many secular thinkers continued to see the Church, not as a partner in the task 
of liberating people from oppression, but as one of the forces of oppression from which 
people had to be liberated. This attitude has continued in the identification of the task which 
liberal political philosophy has set itself. The tradition of political thought from Hobbes and 
Locke has taken for granted that the problems created by religious intolerance and by the 
wars of religion had identified the problem for which liberal institutions and liberal 
philosophy was the solution. The inability of people to agree on what constitutes their 
ultimate good means they can only manage to live together in peace and harmony if they 
leave questions of the good (also common good!) to one side and concentrate on matters of 
process and the right. At heart, liberal political philosophy has been suspicious of religion, 
and this suspicion is often reinforced by the heritage of the Enlightenment accompanying 
liberal thought. It is a testimony to the intellectual good faith of the Catholic Church that its 
own positive assessment of the valid core of liberal political thought has not been revoked 
due to a lack of reciprocity by liberal thinkers. 
 
Forty years after Gaudium et spes it is appropriate to review the way in which the Church 
understands its relationship to the world of politics. It would be necessary to identify the 
hopes and anxieties which now shape public life. But also perhaps with special urgency, it 
would be important to identify the possibilities for dialogue with partners from outside the 
community of faith. Now more than ever it is important for such a dialogue with humankind 
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that the Church attend to the way in which her messages are received so as to be able to 
communicate effectively with contemporaries. This is not to suggest that public image should 
be a criterion of validity, but to emphasise that communication which does not take into 
consideration how it will be received, can be futile, or even counterproductive. 
 
Recent developments within political philosophy have facilitated the emergence of new 
attitudes towards religion, replacing the antagonism rooted in the Enlightenment with an 
appreciation of religion’s positive contributions to political order. Among the relevant 
developments are the communitarian critique of liberalism, the attention being paid to civil 
society, and the increased awareness of social capital. Each of these developments allows for 
a revisiting of the relationship between religion and politics. 
 
In particular, the discussion of religion as an element of civil society seems to offer a positive 
account of religion, with which citizens of faith might be satisfied. A new concept of civil 
society is emerging. Much of the newness is driven by the experiences of people involved in 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which play an increasingly important role in 
national and international affairs. The new emphasis on civil society poses questions for 
traditional understandings of both politics and religion. I argue that while there are attractive 
possibilities arising from the interest in civil society, there are also serious disadvantages, and 
that John Rawls’s analysis of public reason and political culture might be more useful. 
 
The Problem: Religion and Polit ics  
 
The relationship between religion and politics is complex, and cannot be comprehended with 
a simple intellectual tool. Attempts to do so have proved unsatisfactory. On the one hand, 
there has been the attempt to subordinate one to the other, using the concepts of means and 
ends, and on the other hand, there has been the attempt to keep them separate, using a pair of 
concepts such as private and public. The instrumentalisation of one for the sake of the other is 
exemplified on the one hand in Rousseau’s proposal of a civil religion, and on the other hand 
in the subordination by some medieval thinkers of the common good of temporal peace and 
justice to the ultimate good of divine peace and justice. Neither position is satisfactory, since 
each of them involves a denial of some essential element of either religion or politics. At the 
same time the liberal tradition of confining religion to the realm of the private while 
considering politics to be concerned with public matters has foundered on the refusal of 
religion to be excluded from public life. Given the undeniable presence of religion, how is 
this to be accommodated conceptually? 
 
An adequate conceptual accommodation must satisfy views from two perspectives. It must 
allow for an understanding of the role of religion from the perspective of the political 
community, and it must allow citizens of faith to understand their participation in the political 
community in a manner consistent with their self-understanding as members of the Church. 
They must be able to combine their theological self-understanding with their understanding 
of themselves as participants in the political community. Sophistication is required, whereby 
a split-level self-understanding must be articulated. 
 
The relationship in the past has often been seen as one of mutual antagonism. From the 
Church’s perspective, the assertion of human autonomy and the exaltation of liberty on which 
the liberal state was based appeared as rebellion against God and the refusal of the obedience 
which the creature owed the Creator. The failure to respect a divine source for law and 
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morality was expected to lead to a disintegration of moral order and a collapse of respect for 
law. From the perspective of the liberal polity, the claim of religious authority to command 
the obedience of citizens, and often not only that of the members of the religious bodies in 
question, appeared as a threat to the freedom of citizens. The reliance on faith implied that 
believers were not amenable to rational argument as democratic politics required, and so 
constituted a potential subversion from within. 
 
That antagonism has not disappeared completely from the relationship.4 There are some 
issues which continue to provide a battleground of the secular and the religious, and there are 
some places where traditional religious division continues to frustrate politics. Examples of 
the latter include Northern Ireland, the Balkan states, and Palestine. An example of the 
former is the set of disputes surrounding the legal protection of human life, including 
abortion, embryo production for experimentation, and euthanasia.5 Opinions on these 
controversial matters frequently follow the fault line of religious affiliation, even if Catholics 
insist that they rely only on arguments based on reason. 
 
The liberal maintains that the governing of human societies must be with the consent of the 
governed. The theocrat maintains that the governing of human societies must be according to 
the law of God and that revelation provides what is needed for the task of human 
government. For the liberal, theocracy must always be suspect, because of the fear that the 
will of God (as interpreted by the powers that be) will be imposed on those who do not accept 
it, because they do not share the faith of the powers. This fear is warranted historically, and 
John Rawls, for instance, makes a great deal of the history of religious persecution, and the 
turmoil caused by the wars of religion in Europe as the background to his political 
liberalism.6
 
Faced with the ever threatening prospect of religious fanatics achieving political power and 
imposing their view of the world and of social order on everyone, liberal regimes put in place 
a set of regulations and structures in order to nip the religiously motivated tyranny in the bud. 
The regulations and structures include measures which can be roughly identified as follows, 
not necessarily in any order of significance: 
 
• The separation of church and state 
• The rule of law guaranteeing individual liberties including freedom of speech, 
freedom of religion and the freedoms of movement and association 
• A secular foundation for the state, with authorities derived from the consent of the 
governed 
• A culture in which toleration is fostered, such that beliefs and practices are to be 
permitted up to the point at which they harm society or harm others 
• A culture in which certain standards of argument are established and enforced through 
social pressure. For the most part, those standards are modelled on the forms of 
argument appropriate to the law 
• A culture in which there is a sharp separation of public and private, such that religious 
matters are relegated to the private and excluded from the public domain 
 
With MacIntyre we can note the success of the liberal world-view in setting the language and 
forms of debate, so that it can only be called into question in terms favourable to itself.7
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What options do religiously committed people have in liberal democracies within pluralist 
societies when they wish to contribute (reasonably, not violently) to political and public 
affairs on the basis of their faith convictions? We can think in terms of the spectrum between 
the poles of protest, opting out, counter-cultural witness, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, participation in the political and public processes but in submission to the liberal rules 
of engagement. 
 
On the face of it, submission to the liberal rules for participation in public life seems 
promising.  
 
• The Christian can enjoy the protection of the personal and civil liberties of speech, 
conscience, religion, association and movement which is provided for all citizens. 
• The Christian can take advantage of the means of public communication and debate in 
order to make her case. 
• The structures of representative government provide also the opportunities for 
lobbying and campaigning on relevant issues. 
 
However, for the Christian in public life, there is an abiding sense of being on probation. Like 
the recidivist criminal who has done his time, and who is given one more chance to lead a 
‘normal’ life in society, so the religious believer can have a sense of being admitted to public 
debate in a spirit of reluctant toleration. The constant vigilance against religious domination 
at the heart of the liberal world-view provokes an apologetic attitude in the religiously 
motivated engaged citizen. So what can the committed Christian engaging in public discourse 
achieve, while conforming to the norms of participation as dictated by the liberal consensus? 
 
Despite the history of antagonism, there has also been a process of learning and adjustment 
on both sides. In the case of the Catholic Church, the Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et 
spes and its Decree on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis humanae represented a revision of the 
Church’s understanding of its role in the world. While not abandoning its sense of mission to 
proclaim the gospel to all and to effect a sanctification of all of human life, the Church 
acknowledged that it could not and ought not rely on the power of the state to achieve its 
mission. Within political philosophy, on the other hand, there is evidence of a more positive 
view of the role of religion in the political culture, and of the contribution which the Church 
can make to sustaining the liberal polity. 
 
Civil  Society 
 
The revival of interest in the notion of civil society provides a new context for considering 
the place of the Church within the polity. Two major developments have precipitated the 
renewed interest in the topic of civil society. First, the process of the collapse of the Soviet 
block, and second, the process of globalisation. In the first of these processes, the notion of 
civil society has played a double role. Civil society is used to label and reflect on the agents 
of change nurtured by Church groups and dissidents and others such as the Solidarity trade 
union. At the same time, the difficulties experienced in the attempt to implement free markets 
and liberal democratic systems were accounted for as due to the lack of civil society. The 
absence of certain practices and habits among the population, the lack of a moral order in 
which expectations are sustained by social sanction, and the impoverished relationships and 
networks comprising social capital have revealed that the functioning of markets and 
democratic processes is not to be presupposed simply because the formal structures are in 
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place. Hence the renewed attention paid to the old notion of civil society.8 Accordingly, the 
term civil society has a double referent, labelling both a present reality (the agents of social 
change) and an absent reality (what is needed for the reforms to succeed). The relationship 
between civil society and the democratic system is dialectical. On the one hand, civil society 
is a precondition for political order. Without the habits of trust, the practices of argument, the 
networks of associating, democracies cannot function. At the same time, civil society is a 
product of political order, since it is the security achieved by the framework of government 
and law which makes it possible for the organizations of civil society to function. 
 
The second dynamic drawing attention to civil society is globalisation (economic, cultural, 
military, diplomatic).9 The worldwide impact of economic activity and markets reveals an 
absence of state, while at the same time a market based shared order emerges. There is a 
search for forms of global governance. In this context a third sector apart from multi-national 
corporations (MNCs) and state based bodies (such as the IMF) seems desirable, and is 
already functioning through international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). This is 
spoken of as global civil society. 
 
Civil  Society:  From a Pair to a Triad 
The new contexts and discussions are generating a new notion of civil society, which differs 
considerably from the traditional understanding. Where traditionally civil society was paired 
with the state, it is now located in a triad. In early forms of its usage, civil society was used to 
identify society under government and law. This usage is found in Thomas Hobbes, and John 
Locke, for instance. 
 
Hegel and Marx also relied on a dyad, but for them the realm of civil society was the realm of 
market and property relations. Hegel emphasised the dimension of freedom in the contracts 
on which all economic activity was based. Marx brought his analysis to bear on ‘bourgeois’ 
(= civil) society showing that the supposedly freely entered contracts were illusory, and that 
there was no freedom for those who had nothing to trade but their labour power. 
 
All the more interesting then that the current usage of civil society distances it from the realm 
of the market and the economy. The Economist magazine uses the term in the sense it finds 
the UN using it, namely, to refer to NGOs who are outside the realm of the state and of the 
market place.10 Debates about environmental issues in the context of the Kyoto agreement 
reveal a similar triangular model: there are commercial interests, there are governments of 
states, and there are non-governmental organisations which agitate on behalf of the global 
environment. The international dimension whereby global civil society is a counterbalancing 
power to that of economic forces is leading to a clarification whereby civil society is 
distinguished from the economy. In more recent usage, therefore, civil society is seen as one 
factor in a triad of factors, making one point of a triangle along with the state and the 
economy. 
 
The role of NGOs in many developing countries has grown and their importance in protecting 
the rights and interests of people, especially the poor has been considerable. Several of these 
are now so well established internationally, that as international non governmental 
organizations (INGOs) they provide a great service where there is still a lack of international 
government. Amnesty International, devoted to the protection of human rights by exposing 
abuses of rights by states, and Greenpeace, devoted to the protection of the natural 
environment, are examples. The role of NGOs and INGOs, especially in relation to the 
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interests of the developing world, is now so well established that organised civil society and 
global civil society are specified in these terms. 
 
Global civil society embraces that range of INGOs including religious and charitable 
organizations that devote their efforts to the elimination or reduction of the international debt 
stranglehold on poor countries, the handling of the AIDS crisis, the care of refugees, the 
global environment including climatic change, and the fostering of sustainable development. 
All of these bring their efforts to bear so as to ensure that there are countervailing pressures 
balancing the power of states as well as the vested interests of business corporations who are 
effective in mobilizing their governments to represent them. 
 
This is a simplified account of the emergence of global civil society, but it is shaping the 
theoretical reflection. Where formerly, civil society was seen as paired with the institutions of 
government and law, and these were held in a dialectical tension with one another, the new 
model sees a triad of the state, the economy, and civil society. The dialectical tension of 
mutual dependence along with autonomy has been replaced by antagonism. Civil society is 
antagonistic towards the economic powers, and also towards the state insofar as it fails to 
distance itself critically from the interests of the market. At the same time, the original 
antagonism towards religion in the depiction of civil society has not entirely disappeared.  
 
In part, the problem is that the concept of civil society was developed by early modern 
writers (for example Locke, Ferguson, Hobbes) who were concerned about how 
societies would hold together under newly emerging modern conditions in which 
traditional sources of authority – including religion – were losing their grip. Civil 
society – arising out of voluntary relationships between people – was seen as an 
important part of the solution. Religion, at least the predominant forms of Christianity 
in its early modern setting, especially Roman Catholicism – with its traditional 
hierarchical notions of authority – was conceived from the beginning in opposition to 
civil society.11
 
Religion in Civi l  Society 
 
Far from the process of modernization making religion obsolete, there is now a new visibility 
of religion in the public space and in the issues demanding attention. So the Churches and 
religious bodies are spoken of as belonging to civil society, as the realm of socially organized 
activity and participation. This is the recent usage of civil society, which is one corner of a 
triangle. Among the valued contributions of civil society on this view is the creation and 
maintenance of social capital.12 This term refers to the acquired skills and competencies of 
people in their interrelationships. The web of connections is as important as the skills, since 
the skills are effectively exercised in the context of collaboration with others. Also the habits 
of a work ethic, and the expectation of trust and reliability are acknowledged as preconditions 
for a successful market economy.13
 
A new respect for the dimension of civil society is expressed from the perspectives of both 
politics and economics. Especially the experience of implementing new structures of 
democratic government and new systems of ownership, production and marketing, in the 
former states of the Soviet Union and its allies, has revealed the importance of civil society. 
The political culture appreciates the contribution of civil society in facilitating the formation 
and education of citizens, the habituating of people, not only in the basic skills of literacy and 
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numeracy, but more importantly, in the capacities to engage in argument and to accept 
conciliation in conflict.14
 
David Herbert has usefully surveyed the literature in which civil society has been considered 
recently.15 Religion is understood afresh in this context, and the work of José Casanova in 
particular is taken as exemplifying this new approach.16 On the one hand, the role of religion 
within civil society is important in its own right; on the other hand, in the triangle of forces of 
the state, market, and civil society, religion is seen as a force within civil society which can 
resist the dominating influence of political power and economic wealth. 
 
The literature recognises the contribution of religion and of the Churches in particular 
societies in fostering the constituent elements of democratic culture. Although some of the 
literature continues to assume religion’s insignificance, the actual experience of social and 
political change in Central and Eastern Europe reveals that organized religion contributed a 
great deal, and this is acknowledged in the relevant literature. Summarizing this discussion 
Herbert notes four different ways in which religion contributed to the development of civil 
society, even if, as he remarks, the nature of religion continues to be misconceived. 
 
First of all, religion provided an ‘institutional space in otherwise totalitarian societies within 
which it was possible to organize various forms of opposition to the communist state’.17 As 
the restrictive presence of the state diminished, other spaces became available and dissidents 
no longer relied on the space provided, for instance, by the Lutheran State Churches of the 
German Democratic Republic. But at a critical point in both Poland and the GDR, the 
institutional space maintained and made available by the Churches was important. 
 
The second contribution of religion was at the symbolic level, providing a wealth of symbols, 
metaphors and stories, which made it possible for people to interpret their political experience 
in terms other than those provided by the communist state ideologies. The international 
dimension provided by the Churches also played an important role in strengthening the 
consciousness of those who resisted the domination by the state. This is the third 
contribution. Herbert notes the importance of the public Masses celebrated by Pope John Paul 
II on his visit to Poland (and elsewhere) as witnessing to a world embracing solidarity which 
transcended space and time. 
 
Herbert adds a fourth, which is the provision of intellectual resources to animate and sustain 
opposition and the critique of the state. Such a figure as Vaclav Havel is taken by Herbert to 
illustrate the powerful use of an intellectual critique which drew on the resources of a 
metaphysical tradition sustained by the Catholic Church. 
 
This consideration of the Church’s role within civil society is positive, and many people in 
the Church are flattered by this encouraging evaluation. However, there are dangers 
associated with this view and these should be assessed before accepting the allocated role 
within civil society. 
 
Disadvantages of  Civi l  Society as  Locus for Religion  
 
If its self-understanding as a corporate citizen in a liberal polity is primarily in terms of civil 
society in one corner of the triangle, the Church is likely to find itself restricted in definition 
and constrained when it comes to action. There are three principal strands of limitation: 
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assumption of particularity of interest, confinement to an advocacy stance, and exclusion 
from politics and the market. 
 
Among the organizations belonging to civil society are vested interest groups whose 
perspectives are not universal and general, but are particular and local, and often narrowly 
self-interested. Residents’ associations, single-issue campaigning groups, lobby groups, 
belong within the category as well as cultural groups and educational institutions and 
organizations. These all represent particular interests. Accordingly, there is a danger that the 
Church, by association, can appear to represent particular and special interests. This would 
undermine its ability to proclaim its message which is universal and not restricted to any race, 
class, culture or aspect of human existence. 
 
Because of its involvement in education, health care and the provision of supports for the 
poor, the Church and Church organizations have often engaged in advocacy on behalf of 
groups which have been neglected by the market or by governments. The danger is that its 
contributions to political culture and to public debate be seen exclusively as advocacy, and 
therefore to be processed in the political adjustment of the many competing demands which 
seek attention. Especially in the emergent global civil society in which INGOs confront 
MNCs and seek to create global systems of governance which can limit their power, Church 
organizations can appear as advocacy groups on behalf of the victims. While this is an 
appropriate and important role for the Church, it does not exhaust its mission, which requires 
of it to speak of the unrestricted common good of all humanity, and to challenge everyone, 
whether rich or poor, to revise their priorities. An example of this is in relation to the debates 
about proper strategies for managing the AIDS epidemic in some countries. It is assumed by 
some people that the Church is involved primarily as a caritative organisation or that its 
function is complementary to that of the state in managing public health. This seems to be the 
prevalent assumption when the Church is criticised for not advocating the full range of social 
policy measures including the use of condoms. The comprehensive character of the Church’s 
mission can fade from view. 
 
Within the triad of state, market, and civil society, the identification of civil society as the 
proper social location for the Church brings with it the danger of being excluded from 
participation in the discourses about politics and the economy. The Church sees it as its 
mission to address its concerns appropriately to these aspects also of social and political 
existence, and the tradition of social teaching and comment has developed this strand. Its 
politically recognized entitlement to contribute to the public debate as a corporate citizen 
might be jeopardized by a too hasty relegation to civil society, thereby excluding the Church 
from consideration of the market or the state. 
 
The Church seeks a positive understanding of its self-limitation as a corporate citizen within 
the liberal polity.18 But this requires that it be able also to remain consistent with its 
understanding of itself and its mission in a theological context. These limitations of the civil 
society category pose a problem for this requirement. Drawing on Pope Paul VI’s apostolic 
exhortation Evangelium nuntiandi (1975) the Church sees its mission as addressing ‘and as it 
were upsetting, through the power of the Gospel, humankind’s criteria of judgment, 
determining values, points of interest, lines of thought, sources of inspiration and models of 
life, which are in contrast with the Word of God and the plan of salvation.’19 This is the 
mission which has led Pope John Paul II to speak out against injustice, violence, oppression 
and poverty on his international visits and which has inspired Bishops of many local churches 
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to address questions of the economy, politics, peace and justice. This mission is not to be 
comprehended within the category of civil society alone. Of course, in these contributions to 
public discourse, the Church renounces any reliance on coercion or implementation of the 
power of the state, but seeks to convince solely through the strength of its message. 
 
Rawls on Public Reason and Public Polit ical  Culture 
 
Given the dangers associated with a confinement of the Church’s public role to participation 
in civil society, perhaps a more hospitable categorical framework for its self-understanding in 
relation to politics is available from John Rawls. There has been a significant development in 
Rawls’s understanding of the relationship between religion and politics. This is clear from 
articles published in the late 1990s when compared with his position as presented in Political 
Liberalism.20 In contrast to the earlier prevalent disjunction of public and private, which 
Rawls had glossed as public and non-public, he begins to consider different levels of the 
public. He distinguishes three aspects.  
 
(1) The background culture of civil society. 
(2) The public, political culture, viewed widely. 
(3) Public reason: public political culture, viewed narrowly. 
 
What is new in his thought is the consideration given to the second aspect. It is best 
understood in contrast to the other two aspects. 
 
The background culture (1) is said to be the culture of civil society. This has available to it 
many forms of conversation and argument and various media through which communication 
and information flow take place. Rawls endorses the need for as open and free a 
communication as possible in this background culture. The idea of public reason in the 
narrow sense (3) applies in the public political forum. Rawls restricts the idea in terms of 
context, content and persons.21 The context of public reason is the discussion of the law 
which is to be enacted and applied for a democratic people with the coercive backing of the 
state. The content of public reason is provided by the family of reasonable political 
conceptions of justice on which people draw in making their proposals and criticisms in the 
discussions about coercive law. The people involved are judges, officials, and candidates for 
public office when speaking in their public capacities. Citizens also are included in the 
requirements of public reason insofar as they subject their own proposals to the criterion of 
reciprocity. This criterion requires of them to make only proposals that they can expect would 
be found reasonable by their fellow citizens, considered as free and equal. 
 
It is evident from this brief presentation that the narrow view of public reason is very narrow 
indeed. The typical image for it is the judges of the US Supreme Court giving a judgment in 
relation to constitutional rights. The persons, content and context of the judgment are very 
specific and limited. But the possibility of sustaining such a view and practice of public 
reason depends on there being a public political culture in the wide sense (2). In what 
follows, I will outline the wide sense of public reason while at the same time considering 
Rawls’s understanding of the relationship of religion and politics. 
 
In dealing with the question of religion and politics in Political Liberalism, Rawls imagined 
several reasonable comprehensive doctrines, including religious ones, coexisting in a liberal, 
pluralist polity, each with its view of the good life and its notions of justice and truth. The 
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polity is only possible, however, because the adherents of a comprehensive doctrine exercise 
restraint, not insisting on their view of the true and the good, but willing to accept the content 
of the overlapping consensus between the reasonable doctrines as a basis for regulating the 
common life. Each one will have her own reasons for seeing this content as true and good, 
based on her comprehensive doctrine. But the grounds for arguing in favor of this content 
with representatives of other reasonable comprehensive doctrines will not appeal to these 
reasons, but only to public reason. 
 
There are several reasonable comprehensive doctrines, some of them religious, but in Rawls’s 
view of the liberal polity there is one overlapping consensus which relies on notions of the 
politically reasonable rather than on notions of truth. This seems to require considerable 
restraint on the part of the religiously committed citizen. Only what could belong in the 
overlapping consensus might be part of the public discourse between a representative of a 
Christian world-view and, for instance, a defender of secular liberal individualism. Rawls 
asks: 
 
Is it possible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society 
who endorse society’s intrinsic political ideals and values and do not simply 
acquiesce in the balance of political and social forces?…. How is it possible – or is it 
– for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to endorse a constitutional 
regime even when their comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and 
indeed may decline?22  
 
It is very significant here that he writes of both secular, i.e. non-religious, reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines and religious ones in their relation to the constitutional regime. That 
is, he does not consider the constitutional regime as automatically favoring a secular 
worldview over against a religious worldview. 
 
Political liberalism requires there to be comprehensive doctrines which ground for their own 
adherents the validity of the elements on which consensus can be attained, even though the 
reasons for assenting to the consensus will be different for the various doctrines. Judgments 
grounded in a comprehensive doctrine may be true or false; judgments which are part of the 
overlapping consensus are said to be reasonable. Citizens who endorse a reasonable judgment 
in the overlapping consensus will hold it to be true or right on the basis of their 
comprehensive doctrine. ‘It is central to political liberalism that free and equal citizens affirm 
both a comprehensive doctrine and a political conception.’23  
 
While Rawls considers some religious comprehensive doctrines to be unreasonable, his 
mature position includes religious comprehensive doctrines with their appropriate languages 
as among the reasonable doctrines which uphold and sustain the overlapping consensus. At 
the same time, the content of public reason is not secular; on the contrary, secular in the sense 
of deliberately non-religious doctrines are among the comprehensive doctrines supporting the 
political conception. A political conception is neither religious nor secular, but is capable of 
being accepted by proponents of both religious and secular comprehensive doctrines.24
 
Rawls calls public reason a framework, and maintains that it contains many possible forms. 
So there is no single ‘public reason’ but several varieties. Rawls insists that there are many 
possible political conceptions of justice and so many forms of public reason. ‘There are many 
liberalisms and related views, and therefore many forms of public reason specified by a 
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family of reasonable political conceptions. Of these, justice as fairness, whatever its merits, is 
but one.’25 Rawls now includes within the family of possible political conceptions ‘Catholic 
views of the common good and solidarity when they are expressed in terms of political 
values’.26 He also includes Habermas’s discourse conception of legitimacy. Important in this 
quoted passage is the qualification about expression in terms of political values. Rawls refers 
to John Finnis and Jacques Maritain in a footnote, which seems to suggest that their works 
achieve such expression. It suggests that the type of argument in terms of natural law which 
builds its understanding of social and legal order on the basis of the dignity of the human 
person could offer a candidate for a political conception of justice. He accepts that this 
possible political conception might offer an alternative to his own proposed ‘justice as 
fairness’. Acceptable political conceptions of justice propose principles which apply to the 
basic structure of society, which can be presented independent of any comprehensive 
doctrine, and which are grounded in such fundamental ideas as the freedom and equality of 
citizens and the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation. 
 
Thus, the content of public reason is given by the principles and values of the family 
of liberal political conceptions of justice meeting these conditions. To engage in 
public reason is to appeal to one of these political conceptions – to their ideals and 
principles, standards and values – when debating fundamental political questions. 
This requirement still allows us to introduce into political discussion at any time our 
comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we 
give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive 
doctrine is said to support.27
 
Far from excluding religious considerations, Rawls here seems to allow for religious 
considerations to be part of political debate, with the proviso that if any policy or legal 
measure is being advocated that the appropriate public reasons be provided at some later date. 
Religious reasons are not being excluded; but only those religious reasons may be advanced 
in support of political proposals which are capable of being translated into public reasons in 
the strict sense. The reference to the perspective of the common good suggests that this 
language is capable of such translation, even if it is associated with a particular religious 
comprehensive doctrine. 
 
This tolerance for religious and secular reasons in public discourse characterizes what Rawls 
terms the wide view of public political culture (2 above). The proviso, the injunction to 
present proper political reasons in due course, protects public reason, and marks off public 
political culture from the background culture of civil society. But Rawls also emphasizes that 
there are positive reasons for introducing comprehensive doctrines into public political 
discussion. That citizens would have knowledge and understanding of each other’s 
comprehensive doctrines strengthens the viability of an overlapping consensus since 
proposals made in public reason for legislative measures will respect the reasons that others 
will have for supporting or rejecting the proposals. 
 
Public political culture in the narrow sense is confined to the use of argument by a limited 
number of people acting in official capacities within rather narrowly defined roles. Public 
reason as Rawls has introduced it, is restricted in this double sense. But at the same time, civil 
society embraces many areas of engagement in which people associate only or at least 
primarily with those who share their religion, their values, their convictions or their interests. 
The background culture as Rawls has characterized it can be very tolerant, in allowing 
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diverse groups to coexist, but such groups do not necessarily interact. The many 
organizations and institutions of civil society can be discrete and independent, so that on their 
own they do not support a properly political discourse, even if they do contribute many 
aspects of socialization. This becomes a problem in some contexts, when a society 
comprising a plurality of cultures and groups is not actually pluralist in its shared culture but 
is tolerant of diversity so long as groups are confined to ghettos. 
 
The interaction which takes place in public reason can only lead to the formation of 
overlapping consensus if there is some other arena in which citizens and groups can interact 
in a process of dialogue and deliberation. Rawls’s idea of the wide view of public political 
culture seems to be an acknowledgement of the need for a bridge between public reason in 
the narrow sense, and the range of comprehensive doctrines in the background culture of civil 
society. The need is for a forum of some kind which mediates between and overlaps both the 
domains of civil society and the arena of public reason. In practice, in pluralist societies with 
liberal polities, this forum is provided in a fluid way – more or less successfully – by the 
media, educational institutions, and cultural and religious groups including churches, which 
contribute to fostering the relevant encounter. 
 
Rawls’s discussion of public reasons suggests that religious arguments do not have to remain 
confined to the non-public realms of civil society. Believers, speaking from their faith 
convictions, do not have to be on the defensive within liberal political communities. 
However, the condition under which such contribution is welcome is that citizens of faith 
continue to abide by reasonable norms of argument and reasonable standards of participation 
in public discourse. Rawls has a specific meaning for the term ‘reasonable’ in this context:  
 
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of 
social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms 
of cooperation according to what they consider the most reasonable conception of 
political justice; and when they agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their 
own interests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also accept those 
terms. The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the 
most reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at 
least reasonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as 
dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social 
position.28  
 
Is this a more satisfactory way for a religiously committed citizen, or for the Church, to 
understand itself and its role in the political context? It seems to allow for the raising of the 
kinds of questions which religiously committed citizens might wish to raise in dialogue with 
fellow citizens, as for example, questions about the realist foundations of social order, the 
ultimate possibility of justice beyond flawed human attempts, the dialectic between failure 
and redemption in difficult social and political histories, whether the common good is merely 
constructed and invented, or whether it can be discovered to be rooted in an ultimate common 
good who is God. Such questions can be asked and pursued rigorously in our wide public 
political culture, without thereby intending to impose answers, or more specifically, 
constitutional arrangements and coercive laws derived exclusively from those answers on 
fellow citizens.29 Accordingly, this position developed and articulated by Rawls in the late 
work seems to be satisfactory. 
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Conclusion 
 
The voices expressing appreciation of the contribution of the Church within civil society 
facilitate a new self-confidence of Catholics in the public life of liberal democratic polities. 
This is encouraging for the Church. However, there is a hidden danger in accepting the 
allocated public role of the Church as belonging within civil society, if civil society is 
understood as distinguished from the political and the economic. The danger is of a 
restriction which would prevent the Church from exercising its appropriate mission which 
includes addressing the political and socio-economic system as a whole. Granted the need to 
abide by a principle of restraint whenever engaging in public debate concerned with 
constraining the liberties of citizens, the Catholic Church would wish to have the kind of 
liberty as corporate citizen which would allow it address relevant issues without restriction. 
Rawls’s later model of public reason, within broad political culture (public reason in the 
broad sense) against the background of the culture of civil society, is perhaps a better tool to 
allow for the Church’s continuing dialogue with politics and economics as well as having a 
role in advocacy. 
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